Abstract. Much compliance effort concerns adherence to contracts. Parties to a contract need to make sure that the other parties will deliver. To this end they may require additional controls in the business process to monitor delivery and induce contractual penalties when needed. Controls have costs. In this paper we argue that introducing fully automated controls will help to reduce control costs, because (i) they can prevent misstatements (compliance by design) or (ii) they increase the quality of evidence and thereby reduce the audit risk for the external auditor and corresponding audit fees. The line of reasoning is illustrated by a case study of the implementation process of automated controls on the procurement process for public transport services for the elderly and disabled. This is a complex and heavily regulated domain. The case study indicates that control automation makes monitoring compliance to contracts in such complex domains feasible and that using control automation can in fact reduce the costs of control.
Introduction
Business reality consists of contractual arrangements between actors, like seller and buyer. A contract is a statement of intent to regulate behaviour. In this sense, "… most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals" (Jensen and Meckling 1979) (p.310) . Businesses put more and more effort into demonstrating compliance, not only with laws and regulations, but also with business contracts. This effort has a huge cost. The notion 'costs of control' is important, but difficult to define. It does not only involve the visible costs of implementing controls, but also the hidden costs of counterproductive behaviour, gaming the system, delays and missed opportunities because of reduced flexibility and usability (Merchant 1998) . Much of the corporate governance debate therefore concentrates on the question: what constitutes a cost efficient control system? (Tirole 2001 , Speklé 2001 , Williamson 1979 .
One particular way to deal with the increasing costs of control is to use information technology in a clever fashion. Generally, information systems may help (i) to collect and analyse evidence in order to monitor, detect and correct undesired behaviour, and (ii) to facilitate the organization to be 'in control' by preventing undesired behaviour. This may be called 'compliance by design' Governatori 2009, Sadiq et al. 2007 ). The term was initially used in the context of business process management (Dumas et al. 2005) . The approach assumes there is a reference model ('de jure' model) with process constraints against which the evidence of process behaviour ('de facto' model) can be verified. However, in the literature on business process management it is generally not specified how to derive a reference model, e.g. from legal sources, technical standards or best practices. Also, given a 'de facto' model, it is left unspecified how the raw evidence needs to be interpreted and mapped onto the 'de jure' model. Compliance verification is assumed to take place at design time, but similar checks can be repeated at runtime, to make sure the verified model is still operational. In that case, the approach starts to resemble continuous control monitoring (Alles et al. 2006 , Vasarhelyi et al. 2004 ). What matters is that controls have been built into the design of the business processes and can be verified at or near real time.
Generally, these matters are approached from a technical perspective and issues regarding transaction costs, auditing roles and responsibilities and the meaning of evidence are not sufficiently addressed. We therefore prefer to use the term 'compliance by design' in a broader sense, referring to an integrated design of organizational, procedural and technical measures, to make sure the organization is evidently compliant.
In this paper we therefore analyse the problem of demonstrating compliance within an automated environment, focusing on the strength of evidence and the roles of management, internal and external auditors and other stakeholders in setting up a control system. Our research question is the following:
(1) How can organizations ensure and prove to others that they are compliant with a contract, while at the same time making sure the costs of control will not increase?
Our approach will be to analyse a real world case study. The case study concerns the set-up of an automated control system for ensuring compliance of the monthly invoice with a contract regulating public transport services for the elderly and disabled. We develop a kind of artefact: the automated control system. In that sense we follow a design science paradigm (Hevner et al. 2004 ). The case study will help to induce lessons learned about the design and application of automated controls in a complex and highly regulated domain. Thus the case study is meant for theory building, rather than theory evaluation, compare (Eisenhardt 1989) .
In order to analyse the case study with sufficient rigour and to make the outcomes generalizable to different application domains, we will use formal specification and verification techniques, to capture the essence of the reasoning process. In particular, we want to show that the control system correctly implements the contract and that it has increased the quality of evidence.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the various aspects of control and collecting evidence. In Section 3 we describe the case study, illustrating the difficulties of a highly regulated application domain. In Section 4 we will provide a formal analysis of the reasoning involved in the case study, followed by a discussion of some general issues concerning compliance monitoring.
controls, etc. Controls come with a cost. It is difficult to specify the costs of control. The costs of implementing a control generally depend on two factors: (1) the incremental monetary cost of the control instrument chosen, including opportunity costs and (2) the cost of negative side effects caused by or related to the controls (Merchant 1998 ). In particular, there are four types of such control problems: (2.1) behavioural displacement, alter behaviour to avoid the controls; (2.2) gamesmanship, exploit the rules to individual or organizational advantage, e.g. fully use subsidies even when not needed; (2.3) operating delays caused by additional controls like supervision or signing off, slowing down or disrupting primary processes; and (2.4) negative attitudes, e.g. controls may highlight extrinsic motivation (targets), rather than intrinsic motivation, which has a negative effect on motivation of employees. So introducing controls may also add new control problems.
How can we measure the costs of control? Because of the complex relationship between controls and behaviour, it is in general hard or impossible to quantify the costs of control in any objective manner. What we can do, however, is to combine quantitative estimations with a qualitative discussion on the presence or absence of any negative side-effects.
In the case of controls being added to contracts, one way to make sense of the costs is to use Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Williamson 1979) . In TCE costs are defined as "The ex ante costs of searching, drafting, negotiating and safeguarding an agreement and, more especially, the ex post costs of maladaptation and adjustment that arise when contract execution is misaligned as a result of gaps, errors, omissions, and unanticipated disturbances" (Swedberg 2003) . A rational actor will prefer the governance structure with the lowest transaction costs (Dekker 2004 , Williamson 1979 ). An optimal control system is achieved, when the expected control losses are smaller than the cost of implementing more controls (Merchant 1998 , Speklé 2001 .
From a management perspective there are several strategies to deal with (internal) control risks: (1) elimination, no longer perform the risky activities, for example by refocusing the business strategy (2) centralization, restrict decision rights to top management (3) risksharing, sharing risks with other parties, for instance by taking out an insurance or by pooling resources together (4) automation, reducing the opportunities for violations by automating business processes, and (5) mitigation, reducing the risks by taking either preventative control measures, which will make the risk impossible or unlikely, or by taking detective and corrective measures, which will make the impact of the risk less severe. Note that options (1), (2) and (3) are essentially strategic issues. Usually these are given; management is not in a position to alter them. Therefore we will focus on (4) automation and (5) mitigation.
A mayor source of administrative burden and therefore of costs of control is due to errors and mistakes in the transaction data, and in general, lack of information quality (Orr 1988) . Traditionally these problems are dealt with by mitigation: reducing the number of errors by additional human checks. Such action controls, like workflow rules, direct supervision, separation of duties, procedures, etc., are rather costly. They require time and effort of an additional person (e.g. supervision), or they slow down or hinder the activity itself. Another way to deal with the effects of inaccuracy, inconsistency and lack of motivation is to use information technology in a clever fashion.
So, to summarize, we can operationalize the complex and problematic notion of 'costs of control' for the purpose of this study, as a combination of three aspects:
(1) expenses and opportunity costs of implementing a control (TCE), (2) presence or absence of any negative side effects in the behaviour being controlled, (3) quality of data, to facilitate effective controls.
The relevance of this last aspect will be elaborated using audit theory. To relate the quality of evidence to costs of control, we will make a perspective shift from the management, who decides to implement controls, to the external auditor who must rely on them.
Audit Risk Model. The private information problem of agency theory is in practise dealt with by auditors. Auditors are independent experts, monitoring the firm on behalf of stakeholders of the firm. For decision purposes, stakeholders need reliable financial information about the status of an organisation and its performance (Knechel et al. 2007 , FASB 1980 . Traditionally auditors are responsible for providing reasonable assurance that (financial) information is free from material misstatements (Houston et al. 1999 , Knechel et al. 2007 . In this respect materiality reflects "... the magnitude of an omission or misstatement of (financial) information that, inferred in the light of surrounding circumstances, makes it probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying on this (financial) information would have been changed or influenced by the omission or misstatement" (Houston et al. 1999) . In general, auditors use the audit risk model in planning the audit process.
(2) Audit Risk = Inherent Risk * Control Risk * Detection Risk
The audit risk model should be thought of as an aid in understanding how various factors affect the amount of substantive testing required by the auditor in setting up a audit programme for a specific audit engagement. According to Knechel et al (2007) "[…] audit risk concerns the risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail to appropriately modify that his or her opinion on (financial) information that are materially misstated" (p. 388). Usually, an acceptable audit risk is determined in advance on the basis of the nature of the audit engagement. Inherent risk is defined as the a priori likelihood that a management assertion may be misstated, so before considering the possible effect of (internal) controls. Control risk is defined as the likelihood that (internal) controls will not prevent or detect a misstatement. Detection risk refers to the risk that an auditor will not detect a material misstatement, and consequently fail to appropriately modify his or her opinion. Detection risks concern both failures of substantive testing and the appropriateness of audit evidence, including the strength or persuasiveness of audit evidence. Traditionally, all these factors are given, including the quality of evidence, so the only way to reduce the audit risk to an acceptable level, is to increase the amount of substantive testing. That is relatively expensive.
In general, there are six ways of obtaining audit evidence: (1) Inspection, (2) External confirmation, (3) Observation, (4) Re-performance, (5) Analytical procedures and (6) inquiry (Knechel et al. 2007 ), see also the new ISA 500 standard on audit evidence (IFAC 2012) . Inspection is performed by auditors themselves. It can be subdivided into inspection of tangible assets and inspection of documents and records, which in turn provide evidence of the economic transactions. External confirmation refers to a direct written response to the 5 auditor from a third party. Observation refers to perception by the auditor him or herself of the assets (e.g. inventory) or the way procedures are carried out, but note that observations are always limited in scope; the auditor can't be present all of the time. Re-performance refers to the practice where the auditor makes essential calculations and verifications again, based on raw evidence. For example, the auditor can calculate the expected revenues based on independent evidence of the goods or services sold, and compare them to stated revenues. Analytical evidence refers to evidence obtained by statistical or numerical analysis of plausible relationships between financial and non-financial data, for example, number of customers, utilization of capacity, industry benchmarks, and the like. Finally, client inquiry refers to one of the most commonly used ways of collecting evidence: simply by asking representatives of the client. Note that interviews can be very revealing, but will never be sure to present a complete picture. The client may withhold some information. In general auditing is based on sampling and therefore examines only part of the relevant population. By contrast, automated forms of control, such as controls built into business processes or continuous control monitoring, are more difficult to manipulate and can in principle cover the whole relevant population, not just a sample.
These various ways of obtaining audit evidence can be ranked in a kind of hierarchy of evidence reliability. Inspection (1), external confirmation (2) and re-performance (4) are considered stronger, because they produce relatively direct forms of evidence, without interference of the auditee, whereas observation (3), analysis (5) and inquiry (6) are considered relatively weaker, depending on the sources (human or automated), expectations, procedures and audit planning. Note moreover, that evidence collection types (1), (2) and (4) are also the most time consuming for the auditor and therefore the most expensive for the client. Audit fees are born by the company being audited and make up a large part of the costs of control. Therefore it is fair to say that there is indeed a trade-off between the quality of evidence and the costs of control. When set-up in a clever way, built-in controls can be used for inspection of transactions as they occur, and also re-performance can be automated. These all provide strong forms of evidence.
Reliability. How reliable is evidence collected by automated controls? That depends on the reliability of the initial recording of the evidence and on the reliability of subsequent processing steps (Clark and Wilson 1987) . Initial recording should involve data entry controls, for example verification of the data type. Moreover, data should be recorded directly at the source, and if possible, under countervailing interests. Consider for example a cash register. This is the first recording of the sales figures. A reliable cash register will store the amount that is shown on the receipt for the customer. The customer's interest (low price) is opposed to that of the retailer (high price). Therefore the recorded amount can be expected to be correct. Concerning subsequent processing steps, these can be tested and certified (Clark and Wilson 1987) . Both static and dynamic integrity constraints, i.e. constraints that make sure data and transformations conform to their definitions, are nowadays automatically maintained by database management systems (Grefen and Apers 1993) .
Following Clark and Wilson (1987) we distinguish the notions of internal consistency and external consistency of the data produced by a system. The distinction is similar to the distinction between internal and external validity made in research methods. Suppose we have a well-managed computer system. Its specifications have been verified to be correct and 6 6 the system itself has been tested and behaves according to its specifications. That means that when we enter data into the system that is valid, valid data will ensue (internal consistency). However, even in such a near-perfect system there is nothing to ensure correspondence with reality (external consistency). In general, external consistency can only be ensured by a combination of organizational measures (segregation of duties), procedural measures (e.g. maintenance, supervision) and physical measures (e.g. gates, use of IDs). These measures are basic; they cannot be re-performed. Some authors therefore call these measures indispensable controls, because they must ensure external validity of audit evidence (Blokdijk 2004) . Expectation. Conceptually the responsibilities concerning the reliability of information processing and reporting are embedded (Figure 1 ). External auditors partly rely on the internal controls maintained by the internal audit department, who in turn rely on work done by the business. The earlier in the process a potential error is caught, the less effort is expended in detecting and correcting it. Therefore embedding controls into the business processes may have two effects.
First, built-in controls help to prevent material misstatements so they reduce the internal control risk. Application controls can be built-in to avoid or reduce human errors or illegitimate transactions. Authorizations and access control can be managed and monitored by automated system administration tools. For example, log-files can be monitored automatically for violations of the segregation of duties. General IT controls can be assessed and monitored automatically (Alles et al. 2006 ).
Second, built-in controls, such as re-performance or cross validation, may also improve the quality of audit evidence, because of the availability of reliable transaction data. Quality of audit evidence both relates to relevance, i.e., is the data pertinent to the audit assignment, and reliability: does the data provide an accurate and complete depiction of reality (IFAC 2012)?
Suppose an external audit is required. Under both these conditions, the detection risk will become lower: the probability that the external auditor would miss a possible material misstatement is reduced. Therefore, for both these reasons, in principle the external auditor needs to perform fewer substantive tests. Since substantive testing makes up much of the effort involved and therefore much of the audit fees, we argue that control automation will also reduce the costs of control. If the company can demonstrate that they are 'in control' by implementing built-in controls and automatically verifying their effectiveness, this will reduce the audit fees they will have to pay. Now suppose an external audit is not required. The same kind of reasoning applies, although it may not be as easily quantifiable. First, preventing material misstatements and reducing the internal control risk will benefit the company. In addition to avoiding costly mistakes, it will reduce the effort of the internal audit department and make primary processes more predictable. Second, improving the quality of evidence also reduces costs. When more errors are detected and corrected before they materialize this will reduce the costs of correcting them. It may also have a deterring effect on potential violators. Most importantly, without control automation many modern business processes are simply too complex to control at all.
We summarize the expectation as follows:
(3) Control automation will reduce the costs of control, by increasing both a. the probability of preventing misstatements, and b. by improving the quality of audit evidence.
In the following section we will explore this double expectation in practice.
The case of procurement for care-related public transport services
In the previous sections we have argued why we expect that control automation will enhance the control effectiveness and quality of evidence, and therefore indirectly reduce the costs of control. We investigate this claim by analysis of a real world case.
In the Netherlands municipalities have the responsibility to procure public transport services, facilitating in particular the elderly, people with functional disabilities and people with mental health problems. This type of transport services is highly regulated and it takes a large effort of parties involved in a contract to adhere to the contractual regulations and applicable laws. Our case concerns Samenwerkingsverband Regio Eindhoven (SRE) representing fifteen municipalities in the Eindhoven region, to procure specialized transport services from one or more Transport Service providers (TSP). In 2009 SRE decided to sharpen oversight of the contract. There were several reasons to do so. Firstly, the fifteen municipalities were not satisfied with the delivered transport services as such. Secondly, the out-of-pocket expenses for compliance procedures to meet contractual arrangements and external audit fees overran the annual budget. How could SRE improve services, while ensuring compliance against reduced compliance costs? This is the topic of the case study.
Research methodology
Our research approach follows a problem-solving paradigm coined as design science. Design science is about designing artefacts in order to solve problems, in such a way that observations can be generalized and lessons can be drawn about solving such problems in general (Hevner et al. 2004) . In information systems, artefacts can be constructs, models, algorithms, methods and instantiations of these. The design is motivated by the case study. In our case the artefact consists of the contract, a corresponding data protocol ensuring evidence of compliance, and a system of automated controls to verify the evidence. Hence the artefacts give precise descriptions to understand and address the research problem.
Todd (2004) Hevner et al (2004) state that a design science approach typically deals with such wicked problems, for example due to unstable requirements, complex interactions among subcomponents of the problem or its solution and critical dependence upon human capabilities. The same is true here. As stated earlier the notion 'costs of control' is difficult to define. It does not only involve the visible costs, such as the audit fees, but also the hidden costs of undesired behaviour, playing strategic games, delays and missed opportunities (Merchant 1998) .
Primarily the control problem identified by SRE is about overrunning the annual budget for compliance costs and it is felt that the TSP is gaming the system. On the one hand compliance costs are easy to account for. This can be characterized as a well-structured puzzle. The opposite is true when we have to address the not intended negative side effects. These are at best problems, but in practice wicked messes. That is why we think the case study will provide generalizations that can be useful in other, equally complex regulatory situations. In this respect the case is intended to be both descriptive and explanatory (Smith 2003) . Descriptive because the current practice is described as well as the procedures adopted. Explanatory because we provide arguments to justify design choices and facilitate theoretical development, compare (Eisenhardt 1989) . The general problem is how to apply automated controls in a complex and highly regulated domain. In this section we introduce the case and describe the main features and the mechanisms designed and implemented.
Data Collection
Data for this real world case study was collected by one of the authors as part of his profession as a financial auditor, in his role as principal consultant responsible for the design and the implementation of the automated control solution. Data was collected by document review, interviews, and participating observation. The contract, the data protocol, the Excel data files and the control analysis results from the year 2010 up to the present time, are all in the possession of the authors and have been summarized and translated from Dutch by the authors for presentation here. The process model (Figure 2 ) and the case analysis were made by one of the authors on the basis of the raw material, and verified by stakeholders. As all modelling this may have a subjective element. The reader can judge the interpretation.
Case Description
Public transport for the elderly, people with functional disabilities and people with mental health problems, constitutes a highly regulated domain. Transport service providers must demonstrate that their services conform to the regulations or else the invoice will simply not be paid. Relevant provisions are found for instance in European Directive 2004/18/EC ensuring the principle of equal treatment, the principle of proportionality and the principle of transparency. We focus on one particular contract: TaxiBus (TED 2010/S 31-044711 dated 13/02/2010). The case is exemplary for a large class of care-related transport services.
Roles. The contract involves the following participants. First, Samenwerkingsverband Regio Eindhoven (SRE) represents fifteen municipalities in the Eindhoven region, in the role of principal. SRE serves as the contracting authority, procuring the transport services and verifying and paying the invoices. Second, SRE is assisted by an external consultancy firm to verify the invoices and coordinate with other stakeholders. Third, the Transport Service Provider (TSP) provides care-related 'taxi bus' transport services on demand. For the services rendered the TSP receives a monthly fee from SRE. The TSP keeps a record of all trips being requested, executed and cancelled, including data about individual patients and other travellers, because this affects the tariff that can be rightfully charged. Fourth, an external auditor assists the TSP to establish reliability. Other stakeholders such as the day care centres (a common destination for transport) and representatives of patients and passengers are not modelled explicitly, although they do have a voice in evaluation of the service quality.
Contract. The contract contains requirements about vehicles, about safety, competence of the driver, and quality of service. Other requirements concern the contract area, tariff rules based on the number of travel zones, and the types of clients (residents; elderly; companions). The contract contains transport performance demands, about acceptable number and duration of delays or maximum driving time. When the TSP does not meet these criteria a penalty must be paid. Every month SRE receives an invoice. The internal control objective is to establish accuracy and legitimacy of the invoice, given the contract, on a monthly basis. Details of the contract are given below. Why automated contract enforcement? Initially, before 2009, the contract enforcement process was performed manually by the financial bookkeeping department of SRE. Due to the large number of disagreements, the author in his role of principal consultant proposed to tighten the supervision and automate part of the monitoring process. In the new contract, the TSP is required to accompany each invoice with a data file containing evidence of the trips it has conducted. Therefore, the contract contains a detailed data protocol, containing prescriptions about the format and contents of the data file. The data file is automatically verified by a software application run by the consultant acting on behalf of SRE, and the outcome of the verification is compared with the invoice.
Over the years participants have learned how to conduct, measure and control their business, and deal with incidents and exceptions. They have adapted the contract and protocol accordingly. Some day-to-day matters are best settled informally, by telephone, (e.g. traffic jams), while other issues are better addressed in the contract (e.g. performance measures). Currently, invoices have reached almost absolute accuracy; incidents are noticed and acted upon. So the process has also improved TSP's operational effectiveness and efficiency.
How does SRE establish accuracy and legitimacy of the invoice? As stated earlier, every month the invoice is accompanied by a data file, containing the grounds for billing: the registration of the trips being ordered, executed, and cancelled. The file contains vehicle and driver characteristics, patient IDs, number and category of companions, scheduled and actual departure and arrival times, departure location and destinations, tariff, area, and so on. These data specify the services delivered by the TSP, which form the legitimate basis for the billing process of the TSP. The monthly invoice is the outcome of that billing process.
The contract therefore contains a data protocol, specifying exactly which data elements the Excel file should contain, in which format, and in which order.
3. The TSP maintains tamper--resistant automated records of the number of requested and conducted trips, organized in runs based on the route planning software in the central office and on the trip registration device in each vehicle. This means that refused, not implemented or no--show rides are recorded. 4. The TSP shall provide the client with a monthly Excel file, detailed as specified in 5, containing all requested and actually implemented customer trips. This means that refused, not implemented or no--show rides are included. 5. For each one--way trip, at least the following data is registered (selection):
--unique trip identification number; --identification code of any subcontractor who performs the trip; --transit pass number (customer identification number), if any, by means of which user and residential municipality can be identified; --municipality where the customer resides; --customer type (WMO customer, elderly customer or regular public transport); --agreed departure time; --agreed arrival time; --actual departure time; --actual arrival time; --travel duration in minutes; --departure address; --destination address; --departure and destination public transportation zone; --length of the trip through some specific areas (excluding pick--up zone); --length of the trip mileage; --number of zones to be charged to contracting authority --number of persons to be transported; --type of accompanying person (medical supervisor, social companion, non--paying children, family taxi, etc.); --travellers contribution (including any companions' contribution); --required equipment and aids (wheelchairs, scooters, guide dogs, etc.); --status of the ride (out, refused, not implemented, no--show, implemented);
The data file is automatically verified by a software application developed and maintained by the consultant of SRE. The software reperforms the expected built-in controls in the billing process, mostly about legitimacy of trips, and subsequently re-calculates the amount expected on the invoice and compares this to the actual invoice. Actual deviations lead to rejection of a billed trip upon which the TSP is expected to credit the invoice for the amount wrongfully billed, in case the deviations cannot be explained. Note that manual verification of the invoice would be impossible, because of the complexity of the regulations and the sheer volume of transport movements. Verifying only a sample is not possible, because -by law -legitimacy of all trips being billed needs to be established.
The data file is produced by the TSP, the party being audited. They are in a position to withhold information or manipulate it. Still SRE must rely on this data.
How does SRE establish reliability of the data file? First note that there is little risk of understatement (incomplete reporting), since it is in the interest of the TSP to charge for all trips conducted. That means we focus on the risk of overstatement (accuracy): have all reported trips actually taken place and under the legal requirements? SRE has chosen for automated controls on the basis of the data itself. This proceeds in two steps: validation and recalculation. The data file essentially consists of a large matrix. The rows correspond to the trips being conducted. The columns are the required data elements. Validation proceeds in five stages. Stage (1) validates existence of data elements (non-null). Stage (2) validates syntactic constraints (e.g. valid ID number). Stage (3) validates semantic constraints on individual data elements (e.g. location data make sense for the area). Stage (4) validates reconciliation constraints on the relationships between data elements (e.g. relation between trip length and number of travel zones). Stage (5) validates contractual clauses. After that, the invoice is recalculated on the basis of the now validated contents of the data file.
In order to substantiate the claim that such analysis validates the data, consider the equation x = p*q, where x is the amount being invoiced. The price p is fixed and based on the characteristics of the trip. These can be verified in stage (2) and (3). The quantity of services q, expressed in the unit 'passenger-trips', re-appears in numerous other reconciliation constraints in stage (4) and (5), involving the number of requests from clients, the number of routes driven, the list of origins and destinations, the distance travelled, the number of traffic zones crossed, the number of drivers, the number of vehicles deployed, the fuel used, the capacity utilized, the number of entitlements used, the number of passengers, etc. This data is originally derived from independent sources within the TSP, such as the planning module, the drivers' hour registration, and vehicles maintenance, and external parties, such as care providers, and was verified by built-in controls in the billing process.
Although theoretically possible, it is very unlikely that someone without an audit tool and detailed financial knowledge of the domain would be able to manipulate the data, without such manipulations being detected. Note that such a person would need to circumvent both the built-in controls at TSP and the automated cross-validation checks on behalf of SRE. How can SRE trust the way the data file is generated?
As we explained in Section 2, some internal controls are indispensable; they cannot be reperformed on the basis of data, because they help to generate reliable data in the first place. Therefore, by contract, each year TSP is required to have an external auditor verify the design and operating effectiveness of the internal controls and control environment of TSP, in order to establish reliability of the processes used to produce the data file (clause 6 below). This concerns the built-in controls in the billing process and whether data was collected under segregation of duties. In addition, a qualified IT auditor must audit the IT general controls.
6. Each year the TSP is required, no later than three months after the end of a calendar year, to present an audit opinion asserting the correctness of the invoices, the delivered data and the management information. This audit opinion is accompanied with a report of findings concerning the comprehensiveness of the accounting information system. The auditing fees are paid by the TSP (p 32);
Negotiation about Trade-offs. As stated in Section 2, there is a trade-off between effectiveness and costs of control. This has resulted in a dialogue between the municipality in the role of stakeholder, and SRE management. Such dialogues about trade-offs are common in audits of the design of a system of controls (Burgemeestre et al. 2011) .
SRE argues that TSP should in principle be rusted. If TSP is in control of its billing process, the invoice and the data file will be accurate. The stakeholder might ask: "How can you be sure?" SRE will respond that the contract obliges TSP "to present an audit opinion asserting the correctness of the invoices, the delivered data and the management information." Now the stakeholder might argue: "Do we not pay too much, because we pay in advance, and when an error is detected by TSP's auditor, it will not lead to a correction, since the error will remain within the materiality threshold?" After some pondering: "No, the invoices are simply illegitimate in case the ground for billing is not correctly established!"
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. SRE has foreseen this line of reasoning and states: "That is why we receive a monthly Excel file containing all requested and actually implemented trips. We have a data protocol with data definitions". The stakeholder responds positively: "So, you are able to verify the grounds for billing using the Excel file accompanying the invoice?" SRE answers positively but claims they do not have the resources to manually check all trips (about 50.000 per month). The solution for the control problem is therefore full automation of the verification process.
Lessons Learned. Even though participants such as the TSP were initially sceptical about the feasibility of automating controls, after five months the time consuming manual controls had vanished. It now takes SRE about two hours to handle the data file, inspect the verification reports en communicate the findings with the TSP. The level of accuracy is near 100% and all deviations from the data protocol are identified, both at design time and again at run-time.
Hence operational costs for both SRE and the TSP have decreased significantly. From the perspective of the external auditor, conducting the audit became a lot easier because of the availability of data. In essence the sampling procedures increased in effectiveness and less substantive tests were a-priori needed. As a consequence audit strategy became more effective and the use of expensive resources could be kept to a minimum. Therefore audit fees were more predictable, so the risk of annual budget overruns mitigated. From the stakeholders point of view the whole monitoring process became more transparent. Management attention at both SRE and the TSP shifted from backward to forward-looking behaviour, concentrating on procuring and delivering the transport services themselves and the related quality issues. This was a clear unexpected benefit. Some issues should be addressed. Even though the level of accuracy reached a near 100%, parties involved were very aware of the strict procedures to comply with. Procedures often needed to be sharpened or even altered, because they did not fit the circumstances. Participants had to invest a lot of effort in the joint 'learning process'.
Another issue concerned the notion of tolerance and materiality. These well-known notions in accounting and auditing were much less clear when requirements were elicited. There were some municipalities who demanded 100% assurance and that every violation must be addressed, accounted for and even corrected. This demand was not granted, because other participants believed that a deviation of 0,00036% of the monthly invoice should not be treated in such a way. It took about four months to convince them that such high assurance demands are not cost-effective and that operational benefits would vanish in no time. The underlying problem here is that abstract concepts used in specialist fields are quite tedious and hard for non-specialists to understand. These behavioural effects should be addressed in the design of the contract, the data protocol and the monitoring procedures simultaneously.
Case Analysis
We will now give a semi-formal analysis of the requirements underlying the reasoning about automated controls, inspired by the case study. The analysis, however, should be relatively generic, and be easily applicable to other cases of compliance monitoring. The purpose of the analysis is to show how a data protocol and automated controls can be used to demonstrate compliance to a contract, on the basis of an independent evidence file.
We will use Predicate Logic with substitution. Obviously, there are also customized formalisms to express contractual clauses in logic, such as versions of RuleML (Governatori 2005) , or to translate contracts into constraints on business processes, such as Formal Contract Logic (FCL) (Governatori and Rotolo 2010) based on defeasible logic (Antoniou et al. 2001 ). However, we specifically want to highlight the set-up of the validation procedure. We do not use explicit deontic notions like obligation or permission (Meyer and Wieringa 1993) . Deontic logic makes it possible to reason explicitly about violations and conflicts. But when verifying a contract through an evidence file, as we do here, no violations are allowed. In that sense, what we are doing is closer to traditional program verification.
We suppose a contract is just a set of clauses C = {C 1 , …, C k }, represented as predicate logic formulas that may contain both individual constants and variables referring to trips, passengers, and other data types. We have a data file E (evidence) containing facts about trips. Facts are instantiated formulas that do not contain free variables. Notation P[c/x] denotes a substitution: formula P with all instances of variable x replaced by constant c. Definition 1. Language. Let Var be variables, Rel relation names, including '=', '<', '>', and Ind individual constants. Let language Lan consist of relations or combinations of these using operators '∀' (for all), '∃' (for some), '¬' (not), '∧' (and), and '→' (implication).
Definition 2. Satisfaction. Let F be a set of facts, and P a formula, we say that F satisfies P, written F |= P, when (recursively)
Now we can define legitimacy of trips. A trip is considered legitimate when the evidence shows that it satisfies all clauses in the contract. We assume clauses are often conditional, so only clauses that are relevant to specific kinds of trips apply. For instance, a clause may be of the form: Cond(t) → Req(t), meaning that requirement Req must hold in case Cond holds for a trip t. For instance, some clauses only hold for patients, and others for paying passengers.
Invoice amount x is based on price function price(t) over trips, again based on their attributes. This amount can be re-calculated on the basis of E. Essentially, the invoice is the summation of all prices of trips. Because of acceptable deviations in measurement (e.g. petrol prices may fluctuate) we allow a certain tolerance, denoted by ε.
Definition 4. Accuracy. Calculate y = Σt price(t), for all t such that t is legitimate given E. Now an invoice x is called accurate given E with tolerance ε when y − ε < x < y + ε.
Concerning evidence E we must address both internal integrity and external integrity (Clark and Wilson 1987) . In the case study, the data protocol acts as a model of the initial recording process depicted in Figure 1 . In case the data protocol is set up in a specific way (explained below) we can say that internal integrity is guaranteed when the data conform to the data protocol. External integrity, i.e. conformance to reality (both accuracy and completeness), can never be fully established on the basis of data alone. However, it can be approximated by establishing the authorization level and trustworthiness of the people responsible, and on the presence of segregation of duties and other input controls during generation of the evidence E, in short, on the so called indispensable control measures (Blokdijk 2004 ).
Here we will assume that such additional evidence about the adequacy and operating effectiveness of internal controls during the data collection phase is represented in a qualified audit assertion IC, obtained once a year from an external auditor hired by the TSP. If needed, the auditor can also verify registered trips against the system's planning module. Other independent data about trips can be obtained from the taxi drivers' mileage administration. Finally, an independent record of refused and no-show trips can be obtained from passenger day schedules, maintained by the day care centre. Such independent records can be used, if necessary, to verify accuracy and completeness of the trips. However, this is manual labour, which is expensive and can only be done once a year, after the fact. Note that, in order to automate such external confirmations, we would need inter-organizational information systems. This is not impossible, but much harder to coordinate.
Definition 5. Reliability. Evidence file E is reliable when E is both internally consistent, i.e., it conforms to the integrity constraints in the data protocol D, and externally consistent, i.e. the data conform to reality and all relevant aspects of reality are captured by the data (accuracy and completeness).
However, for practical purposes external integrity can also partly be established on the basis of the data itself and its conformance to the data protocol. After all, taken together, the data must form a set of well-formed transactions. This can be verified by so called reconciliation relations (Starreveld et al. 1994) . The data set is complex and attributes are tightly interrelated. Any alterations will therefore be detected in the validation process, unless the provider would deliberately use audit software to manipulate the data. This would require detailed expertise of both accounting practices and the domain.
In particular, useful reconciliation relations can be derived from a normative model of the value cycle, the idea that the flow of money and the flow of goods are strongly interrelated and can be used to verify accounts (Starreveld et al. 1994 , Blokdijk et al. 1995 . For instance, the total revenue over a certain period must equal the total number of goods sold during that period multiplied by the average sales price. The total number of goods sold can then be compared with the number of goods leaving the warehouse, etc. The use of such normative models for automated verification is called model-based auditing (Weigand and Elsas 2012) .
Both syntactic constraints and reconciliation relations can be specified in the data protocol. The data protocol contains clauses taken from the contract C as well as general accounting constraints, such as the reconciliation relations referred to above. To understand the way validation process M must be set up, you must first know more about evidence file E. The file is essentially a large matrix, of which the rows represent trips and the columns represent attributes of trips such as the trip identifier, date, time of departure, time of arrival, the origin and destination location, the duration, the number of kilometres travelled, the number of travel zones, the list of passenger IDs and paying passenger IDs.
Definition 5. Let V be an n × m matrix of data elements, n, m natural numbers. Now define --d ij (V) = v ij the data element in the i-th row and j-th column,
The data protocol contains a file description followed by the signature, the list of attributes and their type. These are essentially syntactic constraints. For example, a date is a valid date; passenger IDs must be known; etc. In addition it contains a list of semantic constraints for individual data elements. For example, departure time must be before arrival time; duration must equal the number of minutes between departure and arrival time, etc.
Definition 6. Data protocol. Let F be a data file, T a set of types, I a set of identifiers, and A a set of attributes names. A data protocol D for F is a quintuple D = 〈FD,T,S,R,C〉, where --FD = 〈fid, n, m, ε〉 is the file description, where fid ∈ I is a unique file identifier, n and m indicate the number of rows and columns in F respectively, and ε is an error threshold. Given the way the data-protocol is set-up, a validation procedure M will contain five stages.
Stage 0 validates whether the evidence file contains the attributes defined in the data protocol. In the case of SRE the data file contains in total m = 98 columns. The data protocol defines the number of columns, type of separation sign (e.g. comma, semicolon), the naming of the column headers and the accepted error percentage threshold. When the data file is uploaded the procedure ensures that it contains 98 columns. If not, the data file is rejected.
Stage 1 validates the syntax. Crucially, validating the syntax is seen as equivalent to simulating the initial recording process. Stated in other words: by validating the syntax the data quality is ensured by simulating certain types of application controls, which are expected to be build into the software of the TSP. Every column is typed depending on the nature of the attribute recorded. For example, the attribute in column 3 of the data file contains an integer that encodes a type of content. In this case the type of transport service is encoded. Hence every type of service can have its own grounds of billing according to the contract. In the mapping, column 3 is defined as an integer constrained by a subsidiary rule stating: if column 3 of row i is empty or the content is not an integer indicating a valid type of service, then reject the entire row. In case the validation rule fails, the entire row is discarded by labelling the row as not consistent with the data protocol. The underlying rationale is that in that case the grounds for billing cannot be unambiguously established by re-performance, without extra tests, which would weaken the evidence from the data file.
A similar rule is set for column 15 containing an integer representing the municipality by a unique code constrained by a subsidiary rule stating: if column 15 of row i is empty or the content is not an integer indicating a valid municipality than reject the entire row.
Other controls check the correct typing of postal codes, passenger ID, client ID, dates, timestamps and units of measurement basic for service delivered: for example travelling zones. Travelling zones are uniquely defined by law and obey some basic characteristics.
Stage 2 validates whether the content of an attribute (if defined) conforms to the value constraints (semantics), in the context of a row. Validating value constraints are crucial as a precondition for establishing the external integrity of the data file, as we will see in stage 3. For example, it is validated whether an address exists and has a well-formed postal code.
Stage 3 validates generic reconciliation relations, in particular whether two or more attributes (if defined) taken together form a well-formed transaction. Here, a transaction is well-formed when the actually delivered service corresponds with the contract and that the billed amount meets the grounds of billing of that service. In general, reconciliation can be used to verify both accuracy and completeness of stated figures, given that the evidence being reconciled has been obtained from independent sources.
Stage 4 then concentrates on relational constraints that model the specific legal clauses of the contract. For example in the case of SRE, there is one municipality that differs from the others participating in the contract for the grounds of billing. Column 15 identifies the municipalities validated by stage 2. Column 56 contains the travelled zones per trip. Contractually a resident is allowed to travel a maximum of 5 travelling zones, except for residents of one municipality who are allowed to travel up to 6 zones. So column 15 and column 56 are constrained by a rule stating: if column 56 contains more than 5 travelling zones, than column 15 should contain municipality code [number] . If this condition false, then reject the entire row. Similar constraints can be put on column values checking dates. For example the date of ordering a trip should lie before the date that the trip was executed.
We will now define validation procure M, which is nothing but a large Boolean function that verifies the data file E against the data protocol D. If M fails to terminate or terminates with a 'false', E cannot be shown to conform to the protocol. make sense given the meaning of A j : E |= S j (e), for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ j ≤ m and 3. if R = {R 1 … R r } specifies r reconciliation relations, then for all entities i defined by a row r i (E), we have that E satisfies them: E |= R 1 (i) ∧…∧ R r (i) and 4. if L = {L 1 … L k } specifies k legal constraints, then for all entities i defined by a row r i (E), we have that E satisfies them:
The general set-up will work, when the validation procedure applied to D is sound, i.e., when the data protocol D is strong enough to imply the constraints in the contract C, as well as reliability of the evidence, at least for practical purposes. We will now discuss how to construct such a data protocol.
First, note the layered construction. Each stage presumes the previous stage, to eliminate causes of failure. For instance, suppose that validation will fail in stage 3. Because we have completed stage 0, 1 and 2, we can safely assume the failure is not due to lack of data or wrong input values or such. That means something was wrong with the values themselves.
Second, we assume that syntactic and semantic constraints T and S in the data protocol reproduce the effect of the application controls that are expected in an ideal evidence generation process. In particular, the protocol should simulate the data integrity principle that valid output data must always result from processing valid input data, when a certified and therefore also valid transition procedure is used (Clark and Wilson 1987) . For more about dynamic integrity constraints see (Grefen and Apers 1993, Flowerday and von Solms 2005) .
Third, we assume that a coherent set of reconciliation relations R are selected for the application domain, in such a way that they can verify accuracy and completeness of stated revenues (here accuracy and legitimacy of the invoice), at least for all practical purposes and given sufficient independent sources of evidence. Such sets of equations are available in the Dutch owner-ordered accounting tradition for various types of businesses (trade, manufacturing, services, transport, etc.) (Starreveld et al. 1994 , Blokdijk et al. 1995 , see also a recent translation of these ideas to the REA accounting model (Weigand and Elsas 2012) .
Fourth, we assume that the legal constraints L 1 … L k are constructed in such a way that they correspond one-to-one with regulatory constraints about trips in the written contract C 1 … C k. Proposition 1. Soundness Given an evidence file E, about the generation of which we have obtained a qualified audit assertion IC, and a data protocol D that has been constructed according to the prescriptions above, we have that
Proof. Assume that validation M(E, D) has indeed succeeded.
First, we need to establish that E is reliable: it provides an accurate and complete depiction of reality. According to Definition 5, E is reliable when it is both internally consistent and externally consistent. Because of Stage 0, 1 and 2 of the validation procedure and the second assumption above, E is internally consistent by definition. Because of stage 3, and the third assumption made above about the construction of D, we can establish that all trips form a well-formed transaction, according to reconciliation relations. Because of the qualified audit assertion IC, we may assume that the evidence has been obtained from independent sources. Therefore we can establish external consistency of E, for all practical purposes.
Second, we need to establish that E |= ∀t(C 1 (t) ∧…∧ C n (t)). Because of stage 4, we have that
, for all rows i. Because of the construction of the data protocol, these rows are precisely the trips, so we have
And because clauses in L are constructed to correspond to the clauses in C,
This concludes the formal analysis of the validation procedure and the role of the data protocol in establishing accuracy and legitimacy. We will now turn to the organizational embedding and the use of these formal validation tools. As announced in the introduction, for this purpose we will use a different approach: normative multi-agent systems.
Conclusions
In this paper we argue that automated controls being built into the business processes can reduce the costs of control, for two reasons. First, built-in controls prevent misstatements and limit the internal control risk. Second, built-in controls increase the quality of evidence, and thereby decrease the detection risk. Given a fixed audit risk, for both these reasons the auditor can reduce the amount of substantive testing, thereby reducing audit fees and the costs of control. In addition, prevention of misstatements and improved information quality immediately benefit the business and the internal audit department.
This argument is supported by a case study about automated controls for verifying compliance to a contract concerning public transport services for the elderly and disabled. This constitutes a heavily regulated domain. The case is exploratory. Following the design science paradigm, the case is meant to find generalizable observations about designing an artefact, namely the data protocol and automated controls surrounding the contract.
The case shows that it is possible to use a data file, provided on a monthly basis by the transport service provider, as evidence of accuracy and legitimacy of the monthly invoice. The data file can be validated automatically. The data is so much interdependent that manipulation will show up in the validation process, unless the provider would deliberately use audit software to manipulate the data. In addition, the contract requires that the built-in controls in the billing process are audited once a year by an external auditor. This ensures that the data is generated in a reliable way. The main work is done by verifying the wellformedness of transactions through reconciliation and recalculation. So in general internal consistency, conformance to a formal data protocol, can help to bootstrap external consistency, given data interdependencies and a little circumstantial evidence about reliability of the processes and system that helped to generate the evidence.
This line of reasoning has been analysed in a semi-formal exposition using predicate logic. The formal definitions and the structure of the proof that a data protocol constructed according to a number of assumptions is sound, i.e., manages to verify contractual clauses, makes the underlying assumptions explicit. For example, we separate assumptions about the formal verification process and assumptions about the way the evidence was generated.
A known benefit of automated controls is that assurance can be provided at or near real time.
In the example case, validation is done on a monthly basis in batch mode. However, the same kind of validation can in principle also be done per row on a dynamic basis. In that case, it would become a form of continuous control monitoring or continuous assurance (Vasarhelyi et al. 2004 ). Recalculation requires totals, but in principle also recalculation could be done dynamically for any sub-total (per day, per week, per month) as the process develops.
What are the lessons learned? Despite initial reluctance, the case shows that the automated control procedures were quickly adopted. For the stakeholder the compliance process has become more transparent. It now only takes about two hours to monitor compliance of an invoice to the contract. Accuracy is high and deviations can generally be explained. Hence operational costs for both the transport provider and the stakeholder have been reduced. Auditors can rely on the data and audit strategy has become more effective, making the audit expenses more predictable. An unexpected benefit was that management attention of both the transport provider and the stakeholder has shifted from solving compliance issues, to the quality of the transport services themselves. This has lead to improvements for passengers.
The notion of costs of control is hard to specify. It does not only involve the visible costs of implementing controls, but also hidden costs of negative side-effects, like gaming the system, delays and lost opportunities. Nevertheless, summarizing these findings, we can say that the costs of control related to monitoring compliance have decreased, both for each of the participants individually and for the whole network. The benefits at the stakeholder are larger than the expenses of the newly introduced intermediary.
A very important finding is that abstract concepts used in specialist fields, like accounting, auditing and control, are quite tedious and hard for non-specialists to understand. These behavioural effects should be taken into account in the design of the contract, the data protocol and the monitoring procedures simultaneously.
The case demonstrates that as a result of control automation, the roles of participants are changing. These changes are in line with expectations (Chan and Vasarhelyi 2011 ).
-An interesting observation concerns the emerging role of the intermediary or audit consultant. The role of the audit consultant is to set standards for evidence (data protocol) and to set up automated validation and verification techniques, on behalf of the stakeholders or regulators. Another auditor must still verify the indispensable measures of internal control.
-For the regulator and stakeholders things are also changing. Due to the control automation and the subsequent learning process, they are forced to formulate their compliance and assurance demands much more clearly. Such demands are based on legislation, the business needs and risks. Now they need to be made measurable, using clear performance indicators.
-As for the auditee, it is most likely that the design of the system of internal controls will alter due to the increased role of information systems. The auditee is made responsible for the controls. In automated environments it is likely that some form of monitoring on the operating effectiveness of these controls will become useful.
-As a consequence the role of the auditor is diminishing. It becomes more and more feasible to certify controls at design time. Auditing at runtime or after the fact is gradually being replaced by conflict resolution and process improvement advice. Suppose a deviation is found: how should it be handled? This conflict resolution and consulting role to the business are being taken over by the intermediary; in many cases also the internal audit department can claim this role. Process management skills and timely communication are likely to emerge as new qualifications for auditors. However, an external auditor remains necessary for independent certification.
The shifts in the role of the participants highlight that techniques for automated control, such as continuous control monitoring and process verification, need not only be studied at a technical level, but crucially also involve the audit technical aspects, and commercial, legal and organizational embedding.
